In a previous post I argued for the idea of regulation within an economy. Today I want to take one example from the current economic crisis, of a types of regulation I think are beneficial. First a quick overview of the economic crisis. For those interested, I’d point to some good podcasts on the issue: Fresh Air’s show with Michael Greenberger and This American Life’s show, called “Another frightening show about the economy” both of which give a more in depth discussion than this blog. And, while both shows utilize overlapping sources, I’ve found other resources echo their conclusions. With that out of the way, here we go.
The first point I want to make, the overarching point, is the ability to trade across political boundaries, the use of information technology and financial engineering has resulted in both more prosperity and more risk. We are all connected in a real time complex adaptive system which can change direction quite quickly and without any predictability. Credit default Swaps are the nexus of the current economic crisis and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of our current global economic system.
In the late nineties companies started offering Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as a form of insurance to buyers and sellers of corp. bonds. A CDS is basically a contract wherein a buyer gets insurance from a seller against a third party’s default on a bond. Kinda like house insurance where I insure my house against burning down by paying the insurance company money each month in exchange for them promising to make me whole if disaster should strike. So far so good, but a CDS can also be used for speculation, in other words, I can buy insurance against your house burning down even though I don’t have any ownership stake in your house whatsoever. Kinda strange, I know, but here’s the thing, if I have a hunch your house is going to burn down it would be cool to make money on my hunch. But, what if I’m not 100% convinced your house will burn down? No problem, I turn around and sell a CDS to someone else, this way I’m covered. If your house burns down someone pays me and I pay someone else, if it doesn’t burn down then while I’m paying the premium on the first CDS I’ll be collecting revenue from my sale of the second CDS. If I’ve done it right, my hunch came earlier than someone else’s, my premium being paid out will cost me less than the premium I’m receiving. These latter type of transactions, where everyone “netted” their trades (both a buyer and a seller of risk) was the rule rather than the exception. In fact, of the $5 Trillion in corp. debt there is an estimated $62 Trillion in CDSs. In other words, for every $1 of corp debt there is approximately $10 of speculation. That’s what’s called leverage and it’s all interconnected. As you can guess, if one party fails to pay off their obligation it will ripple and multiply throughout the system. On the other hand, if leverage works, it means credit is easier to get, more things are built, more investment is made, more jobs are created…
In 1998 regulators started arguing the CDS market should be regulated. The counter argument, made by both the Clinton administration as well as Phil Gramm Republicans, was the buyers and sellers of these products are sophisticated consumers, and, as such, let the free market work. In 2000 Phil Gramm slipped an amendment into an omnibus bill making it law that CDSs would not be regulated. As I understand it, not one senator (Democrat or Republican) opposed the amendment. But here’s the rub. The economy is situated within a larger interconnected system. If there is a disruption because of these financial instruments then a large number of “innocent bystanders”, people who had no part of the transaction, will be harmed. Meaning, there’s a role for government to at least regulate this market enough to know if harm is coming and to minimize some of the chances for harm.
Not allowing these instruments is draconian and counterproductive. Insurance has a long history of being useful in capitalist economies, it encourages risk taking and provides people with a partial shield against bad luck. Even the kind of speculation involved in CDSs where the owners of the bond were not involved has it’s advantages. It encourages the spreading of information and the interconnection of agents that allow for more leverage.
However, historically insurance as an industry has been regulated. Companies have to have a certain amount of capital reserved in case they are forced to pay off insurance policies. Further, there is a certain amount of transparency in the transactions so other players can adequately gauge risk and reward. These are the kind of regulations that should have been in place for the CDS market. As written right now, a CDS is a private contract between two consenting parties. There is no way for anyone to see how much was paid for a CDS or even how many players own or sold CDSs. Further, there is no mechanism to make sure the sellers of a CDS are adequately capitalized.
These last three points are key, without a transparent pricing system, if there’s a shock to the system (like the sub-prime crisis) there’s a lack of trust in the marketplace. No one knows who’s balance sheet is real, further due to the interconnection of all these transactions a bank failure in Indonesia can hurt an American hedge fund six steps removed. The lack of a central clearinghouse means no one knows where these, as Buffett called them, “financial weapons of mass destruction” are located. The govt. has no idea how bad things can or will get and neither does anyone else. Finally, because CDSs were not regulated there was no way of making sure a seller was adequately capitalized and it encouraged more players into the market thus increasing the likelihood there would be this kind of a crisis.
Which brings me back to regulation. In a complex adaptive system, like an economy, regulation must allow for changes, growth and the death of individual agents but minimize the risks of the whole system suddenly going through a radical reorganization. Not because radical reorganizations are neccesserily bad in and of themselves but because humans and human society needs time to react and adjust. Further, regulation should minimize some of the more extremes of group psychology (like panic) while also combatting harmful concentrations of power and knowledge. In retrospect, we can only wonder if things in the CDS market would be as bad if pricing was transparent, purchases were registered with a central clearinghouse and sellers were forced to be adequately capatilized.